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THE FUTURE OF TRANSFER TAXATION: REPEAL,




Taxation of gratuitous transfers is a venerable component of the federal
tax system. We have had an estate tax,' which includes within its base
certain lifetime dispositions testamentary in nature, since 1916. Taxation of
gifts2 has been a significant component since 1932.1 With a tentative begin-
ning in 1976, 4 aborted retroactively and replaced with a substitute in 1986,1
the estate and gift tax system is now supplemented with a system for taxing
generation-skipping transfers (GST).6 As a result of reforms enacted in
1976, 7 and later enactments, the system is now largely unified and is, at
least in a formal sense, coherent. However, the transfer tax system remains
deficient in a number of ways. The adequacy of the system can be measured
in terms of whether it accomplishes its objectives. Under this measure, the
system, apart from raising comparatively insignificant revenue, is a failure.
Its adequacy can also be measured in terms of the traditional tests of a
good tax system, which employ standards of efficiency, fairness, and neu-
trality. Under this measure, the system also fails. Concededly, no tax system
can be expected to be perfect. The extent to which imperfections can be
reasonably tolerated and accepted is in part a function of the revenues
produced by the system. The imperfections within a system are costs which
should be borne only if the revenues generated are adequate to warrant the
costs. The current system is too costly. It can be improved. However, the
improvements possible in relation to revenues likely to be generated from
transfer taxation under the existing system, if implemented, are unlikely to
make the costs of the system acceptable. The fundamental problem under
the present system lies in its focus on the transferor, the donor, or decedent
who is transferring accumulated wealth. The tax is imposed on the transferor
* Ball Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
1. I.R.C. §§ 2001-2056A (1988 & Supp. 1993).
2. I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
3. For a history of transfer taxation, see David M. Hudson, Tax Policy and the Federal
Taxation of the Transfer of Wealth, 19 WLAm=rE L.J. 1, 9-32 (1983).
4. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
5. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
6. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
7. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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and is measured by the type and value of wealth transferred, and the extent
of imposition is determined by reference to the circumstances of the trans-
feror and by exclusions and exemptions accorded the transferor. Such a
system inherently invites manipulation and avoidance by the transferor and
penalizes those who are unwary or who fail to pursue avoidance measures.
The system's inherent invitation to manipulate and its penalties for failure
to do so cause it to be unfair, inefficient, and nonneutral.
Whether accumulated wealth is a proper subject of taxation is a matter
over which economists disagrees and is essentially a political question.
Assuming that wealth transfer or receipt is a proper base for the imposition
of tax, the question of how much revenue should be derived from such
base is also a political question. However, the question of whether a
particular system for taxing accumulated wealth is useful and worthwhile,
though not devoid of political significance, is essentially a practical and
utilitarian matter. This essay suggests that as a practical and utilitarian
matter, the present estate, gift, and generation-skipping tax system should
be abandoned. 9 It acknowledges that the present system can be improved.
It suggests, however, that the improvements possible are not sufficient to
warrant retention of the old systerf. It suggests that if wealth is to be taxed
upon transfer, two models which focus on the transferee rather than the
transferor, are likely to offer more acceptable methods of accomplishing
that task. One of these models is an accessions tax. The other treats the
receipt of gifts and bequests as taxable income to the recipient. This essay
first assesses the adequacy of the existing system in relation to its apparent
objectives, and then examines the system under the policy measures of
fairness, efficiency, and neutrality.10 It concludes with a consideration of
alternative models for taxing the receipt of wealth.
8. See generally Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MIcH. L. Rnv. 69,
86-121 (1991).
9. The suggestion that estate and gift taxes should be repealed is not novel. See Joel
C. Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACusE L. REv. 1215 (1984)
(arguing for repeal of estate tax due to minimal revenue and progressivity effects); Charles 0.
Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 TAx NoTEs 1413 (Sept. 16, 1991)
(suggesting lost revenues be made up through income tax changes); Gerald P. Moran, Estate
and Gift Taxation: The Case for Repeal, 13 TAx NotEs 339 (Aug. 17, 1981) (supporting repeal
of estate and gift taxes because of cost, complexity, distortion in private planning, and failure
of system to achieve its purposes); Robert B. Smith, Burying the Estate Tax without Resur-
recting its Problems, 55 TAX NoTEs 1799 (June 29, 1992) (faulting Galvin's suggested income
tax changes and presenting alternatives). These commentators generally fault the present system
for inadequate revenues and lack of fairness, efficiency, and neutrality. Others discuss the
inadequacy of the present system in the context of suggested alternatives, including an accessions
tax and the inclusion of donative receipts in the income tax base. See sources cited infra note
135. Significantly, Australia and Canada have abolished their transfer tax systems. See Willard
H. Pedrick, Oh to Die Down Under! Abolition of Death and Gift Duties in Australia, 35 TAX
LAW. 113 (1981); Carter, Federal Abandonment of the Estate Tax: The Intergovernmental
Fiscal Dimension, 21 CANAnsu TAx J. 232 (1973).
10. For a discussion of the ideals of fairness, efficiency, and neutrality, see Stanley S.
Surrey & Gerald M. Brannon, Simplification and Equity as Goals of Tax Policy, 9 Wm. &
MARY L. Rnv. 915 (1968).
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II. GoALs OF THE TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM
Several goals have, from time to time, been ascribed to the transfer tax
system. One that has been articulated from time to time, particularly during
the 1930s, is the breaking up or reducing of concentrations of wealth."
Another is that of producing revenue.' 2 More recently, the system has been
"justified" for its role or potential in adding an element of progressivity
to the overall federal tax system.'3 An examination of the transfer tax
system in relation to these perceived goals is in order.
A. Reducing Concentrations of Wealth
However worthwhile the objective of breaking up or reducing concen-
trations of wealth may be, commentators generally agree that the transfer
tax system has been ineffective in this regard. A study in 1978 concluded
that transfer tax revenues were so small in relation to the wealth possessed
by the top .5 percent of the population that the system could not have had
a significant effect on wealth redistribution.14 Another commentator writing
in 1983 concluded that transfer taxes have done little to reduce concentra-
tions of wealth.' Notwithstanding occasional expressions to the contrary, 6
Congress has shown little interest in the role of transfer taxes in breaking
up concentrations of wealth. Its actions move in the opposite direction. In
the Tax Reform Act of 197617 Congress, in enacting the reforms resulting
in unification of the estate and gift tax systems and reduction in the number
of persons affected, knowingly reduced revenues from transfer taxes. It did
so again in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 19811 when it expanded
the unified credit, 9 thus exempting gratuitous transfers under $600,000 from
tax, permitted an unlimited marital deduction,20 and revised the rate structure
to phase in a reduction of the maximum rate bracket from seventy percent
to fifty percent. 2' Congress did, however, restore a small element of pro-
11. Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. RE,. 223, 235-
36 (1956).
12. Id. at 231.
13. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259
(1983).
14. G. P. Verbit, Do Estate and Gift Taxes Affect Wealth Distribution?, 117 TR. &
EsT. 598, 604 (1978) (constituting part one of two-part article).
15. Graetz, supra note 13, at 271.
16. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
105, 226 (stating that breaking up concentrations of wealth remains a goal of transfer tax
system).
17. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
18. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
19. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (Supp. 1993). The credit, as phased in, offsets the tax on the
first $600,000 of donative transfers.
20. I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 (Supp. 1993).
21. I.R.C. § 2001 (Supp. 1993).
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gressivity to the system in 198822 by phasing out the benefit of the graduated
structure for estates over $10,000,000.23
It is clear that for political reasons or otherwise, Congress has little
interest in using transfer taxes as an instrument to reduce concentrations of
wealth. Joseph Peckman of the Brookings Institute was probably correct in
his observation that "the public does not appear to accept the desirability
of a vigorous estate and gift tax system."' 4 Professor Graetz, in likewise
concluding that the people "do not seem to like heavy taxes on bequests"
pointed to the poor reception given to George McGovern's proposal to
heavily tax inheritances above a certain amount and to a California initiative
to repeal that state's inheritance tax. 25 He concluded that sixty-four percent
of California voters must believe that they will be among the wealthiest five
to ten percent of the population at death.26
The transfer tax system simply has not made a significant contribution
to a goal of breaking up wealth concentration. Although in 1992 transfer
taxes produced revenues of approximately $12 billion from the wealthiest
one percent of the population,27 that amount is relatively minuscule in
relation to the objective. 2s Absent a significant change in the political climate,
which appears unlikely in the foreseeable future, it is improbable that the
system will be called upon to more effectively address perceived problems
of wealth concentration.
B. Production of Revenue
The second, and perhaps the historically more important goal of the
transfer tax system, is that of producing revenue.29 In the mid to late 1930s,
the transfer tax system was a major component of the federal tax system,
producing more than six percent of total revenues and in one year, 1936,
ten percent.30 Significantly, in 1934 transfer tax receipts were twenty-seven
percent of individual income tax receipts.31 In 1936, the $379 million
produced in transfer taxes amounted to more than fifty-six percent of the
$674 million produced by the individual income tax.12 Since World War II,
however, transfer tax revenues have rarely exceeded two percent of total
22. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat.
3342 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
23. I.R.C. 2001(b)(3).
24. J. PECKMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 255 (5th ed. 1987).
25. Graetz, supra note 13, at 285.
26. Id. at 285.
27. COMMERCE DEP'T, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 316 (1992) [here-
inafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
28. Alicia H. Munnell, Wealth Transfer Taxation: The Relative Role for Estate and
Income Taxes, NEw ENG. ECON. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 6.
29. Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 231.
30. Id. at 239.
31. Id. at 240.
32. Id.
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federal tax collections and as a result of recent changes, have diminished
to approximately 1.1 percent. 33 This decline reflects the greater importance
of other taxes to the federal fisc. A comparison of the $12 billion in transfer
tax receipts budgeted for fiscal 1992 with the $479 billion34 budgeted for
individual income tax receipts reveals a ratio of transfer tax revenues to
individual income tax revenues of only 2.5 percent. In terms of revenue
significance, transfer taxes have evolved from a role of major importance
to that of virtually a de minimis component. In 1992, revenues from alcohol
and tobacco taxes exceeded those from transfer taxes by more than $1
billion.' 5
Even if there were greater desire to use the transfer tax system as a
source of revenue, it is doubtful whether such taxes could be adapted to
become a major revenue source. In fact, no country, including those which
have more socialistic political values, derives significant revenues from
wealth transfer taxation.36 A commentator writing in 1983 observed that
decedents transfer annually approximately $120 billion in net assets and that
an effective transfer tax rate of twenty percent applied to that base would
have produced only $24 billion, about three times the transfer tax revenues
for that year.37 The actual transfer tax base is much narrower and it would
be politically difficult to use a larger base. The political factors that
discourage Congress from using transfer taxes to reduce concentrations of
wealth also operate to discourage use of transfer taxes as sources of
additional revenue.
Although the $12 billion now produced annually by the transfer tax
system is but a minuscule part of total federal revenues, it is a significant
amount in the context of a federal fisc operating with inadequate revenues
and large deficits. Assuming that these revenue dollars are too important
to give up, and the class of wealthy on whom the burden falls should be
largely unchanged, it is fair to ask whether the burden can be imposed
more fairly and efficiently.
C. Contributing to Progressivity
A third goal, or role, of transfer taxes advanced by some is that of
contributing to the progressivity of the federal tax system.3" However, that
role has a more historic than continuing significance and is a function both
of the progessivity of other taxes, particularly the individual income tax, in
relation to the amount of transfer tax revenues, and the number of persons
33. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 27, at 316.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell, Reassessing the Role for Wealth Transfer
Taxes, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 121, 133 (1992).
37. Graetz, supra note 13, at 269.
38. Id. at 271. See also Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes
after ERTA, 69 VA. L. Rnv. 1183, 1185 (1983) (arguing transfer taxes have "traditionally
played, and should continue to play, an important role in contributing to the progressivity of
the tax system as a whole").
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burdened by the tax. In the mid to late 1930s, when estate tax revenues on
occasion were as high as twenty-seven percent to fifty-six percent of indi-
vidual income tax revenues, the transfer tax contributions to the goal of
progressivity were substantial. Analysis of data for the early 1970s led one
commentator to conclude that transfer taxes contributed a third as much
to progressivity of the tax structure as did rates in excess of the average
effective income tax rate.39 However, the transfer tax contribution to pro-
gressivity had dropped to twelve percent by 1980,40 and would have been
down to four percent for 1981 if the 1981 legislation had been fully effective
in that year.4' When transfer taxes affect the top six or seven percent of
the population, as they did in the mid-1970s, 42 their contribution to pro-
gressivity may have meaningful significance. However, when the affected
population drops to approximately one percent, 43 today's level, the role of
transfer taxes in contributing to progressivity of the tax system is minuscule.
The existing transfer tax system simply cannot be justified by reference
to its contribution to progressivity. Professor Graetz, commenting on the
narrowing of the transfer tax base effected by the 1981 legislation, which
was predicated on the "myth" that the proper function of the estate tax is
to reduce concentrations of wealth in excess of $600,000, bemoaned that
acceptance of the "myth" defeats the contribution of transfer taxes to
progressivity. 44 Professor Gutman, also a proponent of the role of transfer
taxes in contributing to progressivity, refers to the 1981 legislation narrowing
the transfer tax base as "emasculating" transfer taxation as an effective
component of the tax system. 45 Absent a congressional resolve to reverse
the direction of the 1981 legislation and to expand the scope of transfer
taxes by reducing the exemption level and increasing the effective progres-
sivity of the transfer tax rate structure, the existing estate and gift tax
system has no meaningful role as a contributor to progressivity. The prospect
of such changes is remote and even proponents of the progressivity role of
transfer taxation are pessimistic that restoration of such a role is politically
possible. 4
Manifestly, current wealth transfer taxation can not be justified by
perceived roles either of breaking up or reducing concentrations of wealth
or of contributing to the progressivity of the federal revenue system. If
these roles are dismissed, a case can be made for repeal of the estate, gift
tax, and generation skipping taxes, 47 notwithstanding that they do produce
$12 billion in revenue. This revenue, comparatively insignificant, comes at
39. Graetz, supra note 13, at 272.
40. Id.
41. Gutman, supra note 38, at 1195-96.
42. Munell, supra note 28.
43. Id.
44. Graetz, supra note 13, at 271.
45. Gutman, supra note 38, at 1271.
46. Graetz, supra note 13, at 284-86.
47. See id. at 271; sources cited supra note 9.
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the expense of a "bad" tax system, one that lacks fairness, efficiency, and
neutrality.
III. FARmNEss, EFFICIENCY, AND NEUTRALUITY
Adherence to generally accepted principles of sound tax policy requires
that tax systems be fair, efficient, and neutral. 48 The existing transfer tax
system severely violates each of these principles.
A. Fairness
First, the system is not fair, from considerations of both horizontal
equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity suggests that persons transfer-
ring equal wealth within the system be taxed in the same manner. Vertical
equity (progressivity) suggests that persons of greater wealth be taxed more
heavily on their transfers than persons of lesser wealth. Substantial hori-
zontal inequity has been legislated into the system. For example, qualifying
wealth represented by land used in farming and certain other business
activities may be valued at "use" value rather than fair market value,
permitting reductions in taxable estates of up to $750,000. 49 Also, while
some employment generated post-death payments are within the transfer
tax base, 50 others are not.5' Further, life insurance proceeds, where the
decedent has an incident of ownership, are included in the estate tax base.
However, proceeds of life insurance, even when attributable to investment
made by decedents, are excluded from the base where incidents of ownership
are lacking,5 2 or if once possessed, have been yielded more than three years
prior to death.
53
More important to considerations of both horizontal and vertical equity
is the simple fact that where transfer taxes that would otherwise have been
imposed are avoided or postponed without penalty, equity is violated. A
major industry, that pursued by estate planning professionals, has evolved
to exploit opportunities for avoidance and penalty-free postponement of
transfer taxes that would otherwise have been payable. A large number of
attorneys, accountants, financial advisors, insurance specialists, and trust
officers, having mastered the complexities and intricacies of the transfer tax
system, devote all or substantial portions of their professional time in service
of the cause of undermining horizontal and vertical equity within the transfer
tax system.
48. Surrey & Brannon, supra note 10.
49. I.R.C. § 2032A (Supp. 1993).
50. I.R.C. § 2039 (1988) (including value of annuities in gross estate).
51. For I.R.C. § 2039 to apply to an employment generated post-death benefit, the
decedent must have possessed a right to an annuity or other payment. Where the decedent
lacks such right, and the right to designate the payee, post-death payments escape estate
taxation. Estate of Fusz v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 214 (1966), acq., 1967-2 C.B. 1 & 1967-2
C.B. 2.
52. I.R.C. § 2042 (1988).
53. I.R.C. § 2035 (1988).
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A discussion of all of the tax avoidance and postponement devices
available to avoid or delay imposition of transfer taxes is beyond the scope
of this essay.14 The literature on estate planning directed to tax avoidance
and minimization is extensive." To make the point, however, a mention of
several techniques is sufficient. For example, persons having the greatest
wealth, and thus benefitting most in circumventing vertical equity, are more
readily able than those having less wealth to utilize the gift tax system, with
its "tax exclusive"5 6 base to reduce the cost of donative transfers. For
example, a person who has $10,000,000 of wealth can, while living, more
readily transfer $600,000 in assets considered likely to appreciate in value,
using the unified credit to avoid immediate imposition of tax, than can an
one who has only $1,500,000 in wealth. Also, and for convenience, disre-
garding the unified credit, persons who would otherwise be in the fifty-
percent bracket for both immediate gift tax purposes and for eventual estate
tax purposes can choose to make a gift of $1,000,000, at a gift tax cost of
$500,000 for total transfer related cost (gift plus gift tax) of $1,500,000. If
the "fund" of $1,500,000 tapped in giving $1,000,000 to the donee had
been retained until death and taxed at the fifty-percent bracket, only
$750,000 would remain after tax to pass to objects of bounty. In this
example, the transfer tax saving obtained by using a gift mechanism rather
than a testamentary mechanism to pass wealth is $250,000. Another impor-
tant device for avoiding imposition of transfer taxes is the utilization of the
annual exclusion 57 of $10,000 ($20,000 if husband and wife cooperate by
using the split-gift election) .5 For example, an individual with three married
children and five grandchildren can annually transfer $10,000 to each child,
each child's spouse and each grandchild, totalling $110,000 per year, eroding
the transfer tax base by that amount and avoiding the imposition of as
much of $55,000 (assuming a potential bracket of fifty percent) for each
year of such activity. The amounts can be doubled in the case of a married
couple. Trust arrangements where beneficiaries, including those with con-
54. An especially notable study of transfer tax avoidance, drawn in large measure from
practices reported by professionals in the field, is George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New
Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 161 (1977). Several
of the techniques Professor Cooper discusses, including estate freezing recapitalizations and
use of charitable lead trusts, have been curtailed by subsequent legislation.
55. There are a number of journals, monthly and quarterly, devoted to the subject of
estate planning. Practicing Law Institute annually publishes a significant number of paper
back books addressing specialized estate planning issues and topics. The University of Miami
sponsors the annual week-long Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning, the proceedings of
which are published, and which draws the leading specialists in the field. ALI-ABA and other
sponsors offer hundreds of continuing legal education courses on the subject, usually utilizing
detailed outlines developing the topics presented.
56. Unlike the estate tax, which is "tax inclusive" in its base and allows no deduction
for tax in measuring the tax, the gift tax is "tax exclusive" and gift taxes payable on a transfer
are not included in the measure of the tax. Compare I.R.C. § 2001 with § 2501 (Supp. 1993).
57. I.R.C. § 2503 (Supp. 1993) (providing $10,000 per donor per year exclusion from
"taxable gifts").
58. I.R.C. § 2513 (1988).
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tingent interests, are given withdrawal powers are available to inflate the
number of annual exclusions availableA9
A more sophisticated technique involves the use of grantor retained
income trusts (GRITS) structured as grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATS)
or unitrusts (GRUTS) in compliance with applicable limitations. 60 Under
this device a wealthy grantor creates a trust for a term likely to be shorter
than his remaining life expectancy, retaining a qualifying income interest
and giving the remainder to the donee. The remainder is valued for gift tax
purposes at its discounted value, 6' which, depending upon the term of the
trust and the annual payout specified, can be reduced to almost a de minimis
amount. Typically the arrangement is structured to use the available unified
credit to offset any gift tax otherwise payable. 62 If the grantor lives out his
life expectancy and the remainder thus vests in possession while the grantor
is living, the corpus passes to the remainderman with no additional transfer
tax exposure. 63 Even if the grantor dies before the end of the trust term,
there is no down-side risk. In that event the corpus is included in the gross
estate, which would have been the result if the trust had not been created,
and the adjustment for lifetime gifts includible in the gross estate assures
no adverse treatment. 64
Even more sophisticated techniques are available within the parameters
of the generation-skipping trust provisions. The GST system actually invites
the wealthy to structure transfers in a way that avoids the imposition of its
tax on aggregate transfers of $1,000,000 ($2,000,000 in the case of a married
couple)65 directly or remotely to grandchildren. Effective use of this ploy
requires careful navigation through the intricacies of the system and often
the use of multiple trust devices, reverse Qualified Terminable Interest
Property (QTIP) elections," complex fund flow mechanisms and tax allo-
cation clauses. 67 The system also inflicts severe penalties in the form of
otherwise avoidable taxes where multiple-generation trust mechanisms are
59. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991), acq. in result in part, 1992-
1 C.B. I (allowing annual exclusions for contingent beneficiaries (grandchildren) having lapsing
withdrawal rights, and thus considered to possess "present" interests with meaning of I.R.C.
§ 2503). The treatment of lapsing withdrawal powers as present interests was approved in
Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
60. I.R.C. § 2702 (Supp. 1993). Generally, the retained income interest must be in the
form of a right to receive a fixed dollar amount or a fixed percentage of corpus valued
annually. Id.
61. I.R.C. § 2702.
62. A gift of a remainder interest in a trust corpus of several million can be discounted
under "time value of money" methods to reduce the value of the remainder to under $600,000,
and the unified credit available under I.R.C. § 2010 may be available to defray the applicable
gift tax.
63. I.R.C. § 2036 (Supp. 1993).
64. I.R.C. § 2001(b) (Supp. 1993).
65. I.R.C. § 2631 (1988).
66. I.R.C. § 2652(a)(3) (1988).
67. See generally Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Living with the Generation-Skipping Transfer
Tax, 22 U. MIAma INST. EsT. PLx. 906.2 (1988).
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used by the uninformed or ill-advised. For example, the failure, in an
appropriate case, to give a child a general power of appointment under a
multiple-generation trust arrangement can result in significantly higher taxes
at the death of the child, if the child would otherwise have an under-utilized
unified credit or would otherwise be in a tax bracket lower than the GST
bracket, which is fixed at the highest estate tax bracket.68
A corollary to the foregoing observations regarding ease of tax avoidance
and its effect on horizontal and vertical equity is the resulting consequence
that to a significant extent transfer taxes are "voluntary taxes," 69 paid
largely by wealthy persons who are uninformed or ill-advised, or who simply
die before putting their affairs in order-all too frequent occurrences. To
the extent that the tax burdens those who bear it only because of the want
of effective avoidance planning, it is especially unfair. Married couples who
lovingly put substantially all their assets into tenancies by the entirety and
other forms of joint and survivor ownership as well as spouses who
inadvertently permit the bulk of their assets to be titled in the name of one
often forfeit the effective use of an otherwise available unified credit" under
which up to $600,000 could be passed tax free to or for the benefit of
children on the death of the first to die. In other instances, taxes are
needlessly or prematurely imposed simply when more effective use of the
marital deduction technique could have avoided or delayed the imposition
of tax. 7' Similarly, lack of information or advice regarding opportunities to
avoid or minimize taxes through lifetime giving arrangements causes im-
position of otherwise avoidable taxes. A tax that is unduly borne by those
who lack diligence and are uninformed or ill-advised, and is readily avoided
by those who are diligent, well-informed and advised, is inherently an unfair
tax.
B. Efficiency
Second, the transfer tax is inefficient. This is perhaps the system's most
serious shortcoming. It requires an inordinate amount of attention at the
highest levels of government, 72 especially in relation to the relative insignif-
icance of the revenues generated. Consider, for example, the obvious enor-
mous efforts of the Treasury and Congress recently expended in dealing
with valuation issues involved in estate-freezing recapitalizations and related
techniques. These resulted first in the enactment 73 of a largely incompre-
hensible and unacceptable provision, the notorious section 2036(c), second
68. I.R.C. §§ 2601, 2641 (1988).
69. Cooper, supra note 54, passim.
70. I.R.C. § 2010.
71. When potentially taxable wealth in an estate exceeds the exemption equivalent
($600,000) of the unified credit, it is generally desirable to leave the excess amount to the
surviving spouse, which delays imposition of tax, if any, until the death of such spouse.
72. Hudson, supra note 3, at 32.
73. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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in the attempt to make it workable by later amendment, 4 and then in its
ultimate repeal and replacement75 by Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue
Code.7 6 The creativity of estate planning professionals imposes a continuing
drain on the attention of policy makers and legislators. The tax is compar-
atively expensive to administer. The system's complexity, coupled with the
creative devices employed in estate planning, requires the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to employ lawyers as estate tax examiners, who are compen-
sated at a higher level than other IRS compliance personnel. While only a
small fraction of individual income tax returns are examined, 12,000 of the
56,000 estate tax returns filed in 1989 were examined.
7 7
Efficiency is not properly measured by compliance costs to the govern-
ment alone. The transfer tax system imposes enormous resource and op-
portunity costs in taxpayer compliance and avoidance endeavors and in the
time and energy of lawyers, accountants, trust officers, and financial plan-
ners required to understand and apply the system. The magnitude of human
resources involved is partially suggested by the American Bar Association's
estimate that over 16,000 lawyers consider trust, probate, and estate law as
their area of concentration.78 Lawyers, in drafting will and* trust'arrange-
ments, understandably want their documents to stand the test of time.
Because of the transfer tax system's focus on the circumstances of the
decedent, wills for many are typically drafted not only in relation to existing
circumstances and wealth patterns but in relation to possible changes.
Lawyers may not cavalierly assume that clients of modest wealth when wills
are executed will not have substantial wealth at death. Many clients who
will, in fact, not have transfer tax exposure, receive legal services predicated
on the possibility that they may face such exposure. Standard "sweetheart"
wills leaving everything to a surviving spouse typically include disclaimer
clauses with disclaimer amount trust provisions designed to offer the option
of a formula-driven "by-pass" trust 79 benefitting the spouse, if later needed
to minimize transfer taxes. Standard wills typically include such boiler plate
as tax apportionment clauses and tax election clauses, and durable powers
of attorney instruments increasingly empower the attorney-in-fact to make
gifts to enable "death bed" use of annual exclusions. Given the possibility,
although nonlikelihood, that clients will face estate tax exposure, these
provisions are prudent, even though in reality generally not necessary.
Although the transfer tax system is intended to affect only a very small
74. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, § 3031, 26 U.S.C. § 2036(c)
(1988).
75. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990).
76. I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (Supp. 1993).
77. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 27, at 325.
78. Aaron & Munnell, supra note 36, at 138.
79. Such a trust typically is funded in an amount equal to the exemption equivalent (as
high as $600,000) of the unified credit, and benefits the surviving spouse for life, but does
not result in inclusion in the taxable estate of the surviving spouse.
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portion of the population, such protective drafting causes the system to
affect a substantially larger segment, who prudently, but often unnecessarily,
receive and pay for complex estate planning services. The system causes
dispositive arrangements which could and should be simple to be exceedingly
complex. Understandably, testators want to know the meaning of the
language used in effecting their dispositive schemes. All too often the tax-
driven complexity of language employed is incomprehensible to the testator.
The transfer tax system generates other resource and opportunity costs.
Hundreds of law professors devote substantial portions of their careers in
exposing thousands of students annually to the challenges and intricacies of
transfer taxation 0 and the related subject of estate planning, a major
component of which is a study of techniques to avoid or minimize imposition
of tax. Similar talent is devoted to the education of accountants, insurance
agents, financial planners and others. Considerable resources are devoted
to the presentation of continuing education courses for estate planning
professionals and to the publication of articles, journals, and books8' devoted
to their needs in understanding and applying the transfer tax system.
There are important consequential costs as well. Prudent fiduciaries are
reluctant to distribute and settle decedents' estates before potential estate
tax controversies have been settled. The transfer tax system prolongs the
administration of estates. Prudent fiduciaries invest conservatively, and
prolonged administration delays access to capital by beneficiaries, who may
employ it more effectively within the economy. The system also promotes
the "trustification" 8 2 of assets that might otherwise have been transferred
outright.
All of the foregoing energy, resources, and opportunity costs are sac-
rificed on the alter of a tax system that fails to achieve its supposed goals
and yields only $12 billion in revenue. A recent study concluded that
resources spent in avoiding transfer taxes are of the same magnitude as the
revenue produced. 83 The transfer tax system is manifestly inefficient. The
resource and opportunity costs generated in relation to revenues obtained
are alone sufficient to make the system unacceptable.
C. Neutrality
In addition to the standards of fairness and efficiency used to measure
the desirability of tax systems is a third, that of neutrality. A good tax
80. Professor Bittker wrote to the effect that the reason for studying transfer taxes is
not their significance for tax purposes, but their "power to stimulate and challenge the
student." See Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 239 (quoting BrrrR, EsTATE AND Gwr TAXATiON-
CAsEs AND MAaamaLs v (1951)). One may reasonably ask whether comparable stimulation and
challenge from the study of other subject matter may be more productive and useful.
81. See sources cited supra note 55.
82. See Dobris, supra note 9 at 1223; Edward J. Gac & Sharen K. Brougham, A Proposal
for Restructuring the Taxation of Wealth Transfers: Tax Reform Redux?, 5 AKRON TAX J.
75, 82 (1988).
83. Aaron & Munnell, supra note 36, at 139.
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system should be neutral in that it ought to be nonintrusive-it should not
alter choices and behavior that would have occurred in the absence of the
system. The current tax system is decidedly nonneutral and intrusive. The
system encourages lifetime gifts and penalizes the failure to make them.
Further, the system virtually compels use of the marital deduction in most
cases involving wealthy married couples. In those instances, it thus dis-
courages substantial outright bequests to others. Also, the system discourages
heavy use of joint and survivor arrangements that might otherwise be useful
and desirable probate avoidance mechanisms. While the transfer tax system
discourages substantial bequests to grandchildren and great grandchildren,4
it encourages limited bequests to, and certain trust arrangements of limited
amounts for the benefit of, grandchildren.8 5 The system encourages certain
trust arrangements for the benefit or charity and discourages all other trust
arrangements for charity." Moreover, the system encourages the retention
of farm and other land in some cases, and discourages the disposition of
that land by surviving family members in those same cases .1 The system
discourages certain employment related post-death benefit arrangements and
encourages others. 8 In varying circumstances the transfer tax system may
encourage or discourage use of trust arrangements involving general or
special powers of appointment.8 9 In inducing the making of gifts for minors
and others considered unsuitable for the management of property, the system
encourages the use of trusts. Given the tendency of most spouses to leave
property to each other to the exclusion of children until the death of the
surviving spouse, the system encourages the use of "by-pass" trusts. Because
life insurance is a form of wealth that is fully realized at the death of the
insured, and because life insurance arrangements can be structured to avoid
imposition of transfer taxes, even when funded by the insured, the system
encourages investment in life insurance products. 9° The transfer tax system
discourages the acquisition and retention of life insurance where the insured
retains ownership incidents over the policy.9' Further, the system strongly
84. I.R.C. § 2601.
85. I.R.C. § 2631.
86. I.R.C. §§ 2055, 2522 (1988).
87. I.R.C. § 2032A.
88. I.R.C. § 2039.
89. This is particularly true in marital dispositions, where the surviving spouse, as to a
"by-pass" trust, is often given a special power of appointment that avoids taxation on the
spouse's death, but is given a general power when necessary or appropriate to qualify a trust
arrangement for the marital deduction permitted for qualified terminable interests. It is also
true in generation-skipping trust arrangements where the exempt portions are typically subject
to special powers of appointment and remaining trust vehicles are subject to general powers
so as to avoid imposition of generation-skipping tax on the death of the holder-beneficiary.
See I.R.C. § 2041 (1988) (defining general (taxable) power of appointment).
90. Unless the proceeds are payable to the estate of the insured, or the insured possesses
incidents of ownership over the policy, proceeds of life insurance generally escape taxation at
the death of the insured under I.R.C. § 2042.
91. Id.
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encourages the obtaining of professional estate planning advice. The system
discourages and renders difficult the prompt settlement of decedents' estates.
On balance, the system contributes heavily to the "trustification" of wealth
and thus channels the flow of substantial capital into arrangements where,
given the prudence of fiduciaries, capital is conservatively invested. Thus to
a substantial degree, the system operates to prevent people from making
desired dispositions of their property and encourages undesired dispositions.
The transfer tax system forces use of complex dispositive mechanisms when
simple arrangements are desired. The system is severely intrusive in affecting
human choices, investment decisions, and dispositive arrangements. In pe-
nalizing and rewarding different choices and decisions, it restricts investment
decisions and donative and testamentary freedom and compromises personal
liberty. Consequently, the transfer tax system is decidedly nonneutral.
D. Summary of Deficiencies
To summarize the foregoing analysis of the current transfer tax system,
it fails in contributing meaningfully to breaking up concentrations of wealth
or in contributing a meaningful element of progressivity to the federal tax
system. The revenue that the transfer tax produces is comparatively insig-
nificant, particularly when examined in terms of the imperfections of the
system used to produce it. The system is unfair and grossly inefficient.
Rather than being neutral, it is unacceptably intrusive in affecting investment
decisions, donative and testamentary choices, forms of ownership, forms of
dispositive arrangements, and post-transfer management of capital, and in
burdening the probate process and forcing resort to expensive tax avoidance
advice. The costs of compliance and related monetary and human resources
consumed in the estate planning and related endeavors associated with
efforts to comply with the system and avoid or reduce transfer taxes are
unacceptably high in relation to revenues produced.
Some of the deficiencies involving horizontal and vertical equity within
the system admit of legislative correction. Proposals for improvement are
discussed in the next section. However, such limited correction is unlikely
to make the system acceptable under standards of efficiency and neutrality.
If the transfer tax system was reconfigured to produce substantially increased
revenues, its inefficiency and lack of neutrality would become more toler-
able, particularly if value is placed on any resulting contribution to pro-
gressivity. Such reconfiguration is a political unlikelihood. Accordingly,
Congress should repeal the .existing estate and gift tax system.
IV. REsTRUCTURE AND REFINEMENT
If however, the choice is one of retaining the present system, Congress
may be expected eventually to address a number of proposals to restructure
and refine the system. Even if all or most were adopted, the effect on
deficiencies noted above would be largely cosmetic. The more important of
those which appear to have a reasonable chance of serious consideration
are discussed below.
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The Treasury Department in its 1984 tax reform study9 (Treasury
proposals), advanced a number of proposals affecting transfer taxation.
Thus far, only its proposal regarding repeal and replacement of the 1976
GST system93 has been considered and acted upon. Among the Treasury's
most significant proposals is that of computing gift tax liability on a "tax-
inclusive" basis,9 with the result that gift tax attributable to a transfer be
treated as part of the transfer tax base. If implemented, one of the tax
incentives for making lifetime gifts would be eliminated but many others
would remain. A likely consequence of implementation would be a decline
in immediate gift tax revenues and a deferred increase in estate tax collec-
tions. The proposal contributes modestly to fairness, but does little to reduce
complexity or improve efficiency and increase neutrality. The proposal was
examined and rejected by the American Bar Association's Task Force on
Transfer Tax Restructuring (Task Force).9
A second 1984 Treasury proposal, of which the Task Force generally
approves,9 is a revision of the rules governing completion, for transfer tax
purposes, of lifetime gifts in trust where the transferor retains beneficial
interests or powers affecting enjoyment by trust beneficiaries.9 Under the
proposal, for example, gifts of property in which the donor retains an
income interest would be regarded as incomplete, and would not be taxable
until the termination of the income interest. No gift tax would be imposed
at time of transfer with respect to the remainder interest. Also, gifts where
the transferor retains no beneficial enjoyment would be considered complete
notwithstanding a retained power to affect enjoyment by beneficiaries. The
proposal, on its face, furthers the cause of simplification by reducing or
eliminating the likelihood of a transfer in trust being subject to combined
estate and gift tax reporting and compliance rules. However, in reality, it
renders the law more complex in that the transition rules needed to protect
pre-effective date trust arrangements will require, for another generation,
knowledge and understanding of two sets of rather complex bodies of law
on when gifts in trust are and are not complete for transfer tax purposes.
The proposal does, however, contribute to fairness and may render GRITS,
GRATS, and GRUTS91 obsolete for transfer tax minimization purposes.
92. 2 TREAs. DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAtRNESS, SInPLICI AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
373-405 (1984) [hereinafter FAmNuss, Si~icrrY]. The proposals were not included in THE
PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLicrry (1985),
and except as noted in the text, have not been the subject of further legislation.
93. FAm ass, SiMPLIcrrY, supra note 92, at 389-92.
94. Id. at 377-78.
95. A.B.A. Section of Taxation Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring, Report on
Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAx LAW. 393, 402-04 (1988) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
The report was prepared at the request of the Treasury Department for suggestions for
simplification and improvement of the Federal transfer tax. The Report considered a number
of the 1984 Treasury Proposals and also presented some additional recommendations.
96. Id. at 404-10.
97. FAniRNss, Simspcrry, supra note 92, at 378-83.
98. I.R.C. § 2702.
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A third 1984 Treasury proposal addresses valuation issues encountered
when a shareholder whose shares may reflect a control "premium" transfers
a partial interest in a corporation and the transferor attempts to value the
transferred interest by applying a "minority" discount. 99 It seeks to eliminate
the valuation "abuse" by requiring, in general, that the transferred interest
be assigned "proportional" value from the block of stock owned prior to
the transfer. The details of the proposal have not been set forth and its
implementation is likely to require complex statutory language. While not
flatly rejected, it received a generally hostile evaluation by the Task Force.'00
Implementation of the proposal would make a modest contribution to
fairness in preventing erosion of the transfer tax base. It is notable that the
minority discount problem arises because our transfer tax system seeks to
tax the value of the interest transferred, as opposed to the value of the
interest received. Under the alternative models discussed in the next section-
those of employing an accessions tax or of including gifts and bequests in
the recipient's income-the minority discount problem should not be present
because the focus is on value received, not value transferred.
Other 1984 Treasury proposals seek to tighten definitional rules relating
to powers of appointment where the holder has a limited power of inva-
sion, 101 modify computations rules for certain credits, 102 deny an estate tax
deduction for interest expense, 103 limit deferred payment of estate tax to
situations in which there is an actual liquidity problem,' °4 and repeal the
opportunity for capital gain treatment for certain estate tax related stock
redemptions. 05 These proposals are not discussed because they are compar-
atively unimportant to this essay.
The Task Force, in its evaluation of some of the 1984 Treasury
proposals, formulated additional proposals directed to the cause of reducing
complexity and adding fairness.' 6 One proposal calls for replacing the
graduated rate schedule applicable after the exemption level is exceeded with
a flat fifty-percent rate.' 7 This is intended to advance simplicity by removing
the challenge to enhance tax savings in planning for married couples which
is present under a graduated rate structure. Implementation of the proposal,
while serving the interests of simplicity, reduces the progressivity of the
transfer tax scheme and would increase actual tax burdens for varying
99. FAmNEss, Smspucrry, supra note 92, at 386-88.
100. Task Force Report, supra note 95, at 421-24.
101. FAmNss, SIPLICITY, supra note 92, at 384-85. The proposal would amend I.R.C.
§ 2041 to generally treat a holder's power to invade as a taxable general power of appointment
even where limited by standards.
102. Id. at 393-94 and 402-03. The proposals would liberalize the credit under I.R.C. §
2013 for tax on prior transfers for intra-generational dispositions and would simplify compu-
tation of the credit under I.R.C. § 2012 for state death taxes.
103. Id. at 398-99.
104. Id. at 395-97.
105. Id. at 404-05.
106. Task Force Report, supra note 95, passim.
107. Id. at 397-98.
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numbers of persons, depending upon revision of the exemption level.
A second Task Force proposal calls for replacement of the unified
credit exemption device, which amounts to an exemption of $600,000, with
a straight forward exemption. 08 This advances the cause of simplicity
because exemptions would be expressed in dollar amounts rather than in
credit equivalents. While administrable and more understandable, it is not
likely to ease the tax computation process.
A third Task Force proposal, advanced in the cause of fairness, calls
for making the exemption portable between spouses.'09 For example, assum-
ing an allowable exemption of $600,000, if a spouse died with a taxable
estate of $250,000, the surviving spouse would be given the benefit of the
unused $350,000 exemption, and would thus be able to avoid tax on the
first $950,000 of such survivor's taxable estate. This serves the cause of
fairness by reducing the transfer tax penalty that accompanies failure to
plan for full utilization of allowable exemptions. Implementation of the
proposal would require, however, the filing of estate tax returns by spouses
who do not have taxable estates in order to permit the computation of
unused exemption amounts, and would invite valuations disputes on the
death of the surviving spouse regarding the accuracy of valuations and
deductions reflected on the nontaxable return of the predeceasing spouse.
What is gained in the cause of fairness comes at a cost of greater complexity
and increased compliance costs in the administration of the system. The
fairness issue associated with a spouse's unused exemption simply does not
arise under the accessions tax alternative discussed in the next section.
A fourth Task Force proposal acknowledges the erosion in the tax base
associated with lifetime giving techniques focused on the annual exclusion.
This proposal calls for retaining the $10,000 per donee exclusion and for
limiting exclusions to an aggregate yearly amount, suggested at $30,000, but
doubled for a married couple." 0 The proposal advances the cause of fairness
by reducing, but not eliminating, tax avoidance possible through the use of
gift tax exclusions. An aspect of the proposal calls for replacing the easily
avoided "present interest" requirement for exclusion with a "vested inter-
est" in the donee standard, a move toward simplicity that should reduce
use of the "Crummey" demand power technique.
A fifth Task Force proposal would tighten the estate tax inclusion rule
applicable to employment related post-death benefit payments by eliminating
the current requirement for inclusion that the decedent must have possessed
a right to receive an annuity or other payment."' This also serves the
interests of fairness by treating all employment generated post-death pay-
ments equally.
If the present transfer tax system is to be retained, the proposals
discussed above deserve serious consideration. A number serve to reduce
108. Id. at 398.
109. Id. at 398-400.
110. Id. at 401-02.
111. Id. at 411-12.
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tax avoidance opportunities and contribute to the fairness and integrity of
the system and move the system toward a more coherent scheme for unified
treatment of lifetime and testamentary dispositive arrangements. However,
some come at the cost of greater complexity, greater inefficiency, and
increased compliance costs. None are likely to reduce materially the human
and resource costs imposed by the present system. The effects of the
proposals on revenue have not been authoritatively projected, in part because
many of the details have not been worked out. It is unlikely however, that
increased revenues would be at a level that would adequately offset the
huge inefficiency costs that have been described in the preceding section.
Even if each of the proposals were implemented, a strong case would remain
for repeal of the existing transfer tax structure.
An important observation regarding major proposals discussed above is
in order. Each of them responds, in some way, to a circumstance associated
with the transferor. They involve (1) the gift tax base (tax inclusive or
exclusive) of the donor, (2) effect on completeness of gifts when the donor
retains interests and powers, (3) value of transferred stock from the per-
spective of the donor's control "premium," (4) the transferor's transfer tax
rate structure, (5) the decedent's unused unified credit or exemption amount,
(6) the number and amount of gifts made by the donor, and (7) possession
or non-possession by the decedent of rights with respect to employment
related post-death benefits.
Under the existing transfer tax structure the eiltire emphasis is on the
transferor, value in the hands of the transferor, actions taken by the
transferor, rights possessed or retained by the transferor, and other circum-
stances- of the transferor. The transfer tax system's deficiencies in terms of
fairness, efficiency and neutrality are largely explainable by its emphasis on
the circumstances of the transferor. That emphasis invites the use of
minimization and avoidance techniques and penalizes failure to use such
methods. The entire estate planning industry, in service of the cause of
avoiding and minimizing transfer taxes, focuses on the circumstances and
actions of the transferor. It exploits opportunities within the system to alter
and modify the actions and circumstances of the transferor. The huge
compliance and avoidance costs in money and resources generated by the
transfer tax system derive in large measure from its focus on the acts and
circumstances of the transferor.
If wealth transfers are to be taxed under the federal revenue system,
models of taxation which have a focus on the circumstances of the transferee
rather than on those of the transferor may permit transfer taxation in ways
that are fairer, more efficient, and more neutral. Estate planners can readily
and effectively exploit a system which focuses on the transferor. A system
focused on the circumstances of the transferee is inherently less subject to
manipulation and avoidance than one focused on the transferor. Transferees
are less apt to arrange their financial position with respect to hoped for
receipt of wealth from others not under their control, but transferors,
because they must face certain disposition of wealth which they do control,
are tempted to manipulate asset arrangements and dispositive schemes. Two
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models for taxing gratuitous transfers have been developed by thoughtful
commentators, one employing an accessions tax, the other employing inclu-
sion of gifts and bequests in the income tax base. They are discussed in the
next section.
V. TB,_ SREtE CENTERED MODELS FOR WEALTH TAXATION
A. The Accession Tax Model
An accessions tax, like the current estate and gift taxes, is an excise tax
on gratuitous transfers, but is imposed on the recipient rather than on the
transferor. Being imposed on the transferee, the accessions tax is similar to
the inheritance taxes in general use in other industrialized countries" 2 and
to the state inheritance taxes once prevalent here. Unlike most inheritance
tax systems, however, the accessions tax is cumulative. Each taxable acces-
sion by a transferee, whether from one or several sources, causes a further
climb up the rate table. An accessions tax to replace the estate and gift tax
system was first proposed in 1945 by Professor Rudick."3 His proposal was
developed further by Professor Andrews in connection with his work as
Reporter for American Law Institute Project on Federal Estate and Gift
Taxation, completed in 1968.114 Professor Halbach, focussing heavily on
achieving neutrality in a transfer tax system, has recently refined the
accessions tax model.115 Under his version of the model, the accessions tax
is entirely centered on the circumstances of the transferee. The transferee
would enjoy a modest annual exclusion for direct accessions, but none for
accessions from trusts." 6 In addition, the transferee would enjoy a substan-
tial exemption under the rate structure, and potentially taxable accessions
from different sources would collectively absorb the exemption, and addi-
tional accessions would thereafter be subject to accessions tax." 7 The ac-
cessions tax could either be graduated or imposed at a flat rate. However,
a flat rate would simplify needed provisions that might otherwise be highly
complex."' Generally, an accession would occur only upon the receipt of
money or property, and thus would not occur merely upon the creation of
a nonpossessory interest." 9 Halbach's version anticipates that a donor or
testator may be tempted to multiply exclusions and exemptions by making
112. Aaron & Munnell, supra note 36, at 133.
113. Harry J. Rudick, A Proposal for an Accessions Tax, I Tax L. Rev. 25 (1945).
114. William D. Andrews, Reporter's Study of the Accessions Tax Proposal, in A~MRcAN
LAw INSITrUTE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gir TAXATION 446 (1969). For further discussion, see
William D. Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAX L. REv. 589 (1967).
115. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP. PROa. & TR. J. 211
(1988).
116. Id. at 235.
117. Id. at 229-35.
118. Id. at 247.
119. Id. at 222.
1993]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:539
transfers to a child and to the spouse of the child, and suggests that a
proper solution would lie in attributing to a person any transfer made by
the person's close relatives to the person's spouse.
2 0
A "deferral problem" inheres in any transfer tax imposed on a trans-
feree at time of possession, rather than upon creation of the interest. Such
a tax system invites postponed payment of tax by using trust arrangements
to defer distributions. That invitation violates neutrality considerations in
favoring dispositive arrangements that would not otherwise have been used
and also defers the receipt of revenue which might have been earlier collected
had the disposition been outright rather than in trust. Halbach anticipates
the problem and suggests a solution in the form of advance payment of
"estimated" tax under certain trust arrangements.12' He also anticipates
problems involving use of beneficiary exemptions where interests are held
in trust and suggests elective solutions under which the government and the
beneficiary can be considered co-beneficiaries during the continuation of
the trust arrangement.'2 To this writer, Halbach's solutions, while admit-
tedly requiring complex statutory language, seem fair, effective, and admin-
istrable.
Another problem inhering in an accessions tax model is that of "gen-
eration-skipping." In the normal order of things one may assume that most
wealth at the death of parents would be left to children. An accessions tax
invites "scattering" among transferees within the family to take advantage
of additional transferee exclusions, and particularly invites transfers to
grandchildren, which, in bypassing children, avoid the imposition of taxes
that might otherwise have occurred on the death of children. The generation-
skipping problem exists under the current system and is the subject of a
separate generation-skipping tax. To the extent that generation-skipping is
encouraged under any transfer tax system, neutrality is violated. Halbach
confronts the generation-skipping problem with a suggestion for a two-step
computation of tax liability on transfers to grandchildren, whether outright,
or deferred through trust arrangements. 2  Because of the focus on the
transferee, rather than on the circumstances and exemptions of the trans-
feror, his approach, while complex, seems less so than the current genera-
tion-skipping tax. His approach also seems fair and administrable, and
serves well the goal of neutrality.
The accessions tax model as refined by Professor Halbach, being
centered on the circumstances of the transferee rather than those of the
transferor, offers a number of advantages when contrasted with the present
transfer tax system under the policy measures of fairness, efficiency, and
neutrality.
120. Id. at 224.
121. Id. at 248-70.
122. Id. at 248-61.
123. Id. at '240-47.
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The accessions tax, centered and imposed on transferees, is inherently
fairer than the existing tax system in that persons whose total gift and
bequest receipts are comparable are comparably taxed. 124 Because under any
transfer tax system the tax costs are ultimately borne by successors to the
transferred wealth, horizontal and vertical equity is best measured in terms
of impact on the recipient successors. Under the accessions tax, they are
treated equally. Also, being focussed on the transferees, there are no fairness
issues arising from aggressive use of, or failure to use, exemptions of the
transferor, in that there are no such exemptions. No one is penalized, for
example, for failure to use a by-pass trust or other device oriented toward
the existing unified credit.1 5 Because of its focus on the accession to property
rather than the creation of an interest in property, issues of whether a
transfer is complete or whether the transferor has retained impermissible
powers or interests simply do not arise. 26 The complex questions of com-
pleteness or incompleteness of transfers addressed in the regulations under
Code section 2511 and under Code sections 2036, 2037, and 2702 can be
ignored under an accessions tax. 27 Similarly, valuation issues involving
transfers of partial interests in trust to spouses or to charity largely disap-
pear. Accessions by spouses and by charities would remain exempt from
transfer taxation. However no "terminable interest" rule is necessary and
complex rules currently applicable to term and remainder interests given to
charity are also unnecessary because of the inherent structure of an acces-
sions tax.28 Questions of tax liability and exemption are presented and
resolved at time of possession, not at time of creation of the particular
interest. Issues relating to the amount of exclusions or amount of exemptions
do not arise until an interest becomes possessory by outright transfer or
distribution from a trust, and valuation is relatively easy at such time. 29
The "premium" under the present system associated with equalizing the
estates of husband and wife, and the attendant penalty for failure to do so
disappears under the accessions tax model.1'0 When a child receives acces-
sions of $2,000,000 upon the combined deaths of both parents, it largely
matters not whether the bulk of the accession comes from the first or
second parent to die. The applicable rate table is not that of the transferor,
but that of the transferee. The combined accessions of a particular individual
are essentially taxed as if there is only one accession.
124. Id. at 213.
125. Id. at 224.
126. Id. at 221-22.
127. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2 (as amended in 1983) (dealing with cessation of donor's
dominion and control); 20.2036-1 (as amended in 1960) (dealing with transfers with retained
life estates); 20.2037-1 (1958) (dealing with transfers taking effect at death); 25.2702-0 to -7
(1992) (dealing with transfers of interests in trusts).
128. Halbach, supra note 115, at 221-22.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 223.
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In addition to its inherent capacity for greater fairness and neutrality
than under the present system, the accessions tax model offers the potential
for simpler compliance procedures and mechanisms. The administration of
the accessions tax can be coordinated with the current income tax system."'
Additional reporting would be required, but this can be accomplished
through the device of appropriate schedules or supplements to the annual
Form 1040. Under the model, transferees are responsible for the reporting
of accessions and the payment of any tax due after use of minimum annual
exclusions and exhaustion of exemptions. 32
Because transferees have the reporting and payment duties, and because
the tax is measured by the value of accessions when they are paid or become
possessory, not by the circumstances and prior behavior and dispositions
of the transferor, personal representatives may be relieved of personal
liability for payment of transfer tax under the accessions tax model. This
feature facilitates use by states of simplified probate practices permitting
succession without administration, practices common in European countries
that employ transferee centered inheritance taxes in lieu of transferor
centered estate taxes. 
33
B. Income Tax Model
Currently gifts and bequests are excluded from income under the income
tax.134 Consequently, wealth transfers that are not subject to estate, gift,
and generation-skipping tax are not part of the federal tax base. A number
of commentators have suggested that inclusion of gifts and bequests in
taxable income is theoretically sound under an income tax based upon ability
to pay. 35 A widely accepted economists' model of the proper income tax
base assumes that income consists of accessions to wealth between two
points in time, including donative receipts. 136 Canada, in connection with
repeal of its estate and gift tax system, considered, but did not implement,
a detailed proposal for including gifts and bequests in the income of
recipients. 37 The Canadian proposal has generated ongoing interest in this
country in including donative receipts in the recipient's taxable income as
an alternative to continuation of our current estate and gift tax system. 38
The proposal to include donative receipts in income as an alternative
to the present system of taxing donative transfers has much to commend
131. Id. at 229.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. I.R.C. § 102 (1988).
135. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts
and Bequests in Income, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1177 (1978) (arguing fairness and simplicity
mandate income inclusion in lieu of transfer tax system); Hudson, supra note 3, at 59; Munnell,
supra note 28; Gac & Brougham, supra note 82.
136. Dodge, supra note 135, at 1182-84 (discussing "Haig-Simons" comprehensive tax
base model). See also TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsic TAx REFORM 1-3 (1977).
137. Munnell, supra note 28, at 21-22.
138. See supra note 135 (citing sources).
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it. First, it would further refine the income tax in employing a more
comprehensive base geared to taxpayer ability to pay. Second, its adminis-
tration would be comparatively simple in relation to compliance structures
currently used in enforcing the existing transferor based transfer tax system.
Third, being transferee oriented rather than transferor oriented, it shares
with the accessions tax the structural features that better serve the goals of
fairness and neutrality. Fourth, because the proposal would utilize only
minimal exclusions 139 and would generate revenues based on the income tax
posture of the recipient transferee, it has the capacity to generate greater
revenues than are derived from the existing transfer tax system.
This last advantage carries with it the political difficulty that a consid-
erably larger number of persons would be burdened by the imposition of
taxes measured by donative transfers. Attempts to reduce the political
difficulty by the device of using generous exclusions would be a conscious
departure from the ability to pay principle. No doubt the life insurance
industry would vigorously oppose any attempt to treat life insurance pro-
ceeds as includible in the income of beneficiaries. Whether the model of
including donative receipts in taxable income should be implemented is
fundamentally a political question involving notions of the proper structure
of the income tax. It is generally acknowledged that the current income tax
system taxes earned income more heavily than income from capital.14° A
substantial amount of gains from capital escapes taxation because of the
step-up in basis accorded appreciated assets at the death of the owner.
41 If
accumulated capital were taxed as income to the recipient upon donative
transfer, much of the perceived abuse in the under-taxation of income from
capital would be effectively addressed. Sound income tax policy considera-
tions strongly suggested that the income tax base be expanded to include
donative receipts. A major collateral advantage is that implementation of
such expansion of the income tax base permits repeal of the estate and gift
tax system without revenue loss, and with the potential for significant
revenue gain. The proposal to include donative receipts in income deserves
sympathetic consideration by Congress.
C. Problems in the Income Tax Proposal
A major problem inherent in the income tax proposal involves the
proper treatment of transfers in trust, and the potential for using trust
arrangements to postpone distributions and imposition of tax. An approach
suggested by Professor Dodge carries with it the advantage of relative
simplicity. Under this approach, the current conduit system under Subchap-
ter "J" of the Internal Revenue Code for apportioning income between a
trust or estate and its beneficiaries would be repealed, and all distributions,
no distinctions being made between distributions of current income, accu-
139. Dodge, supra note 135, at 1192.
140. Graetz, supra note 13, at 273.
141. Id.
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mulated income, and corpus, would be taxed as income to the recipient. 42
If deferral by postponement of distributions is considered abusive, a with-
holding tax could be imposed on the trustees of large trusts, which could
be credited against liability by distributees when distributions occur and
become taxable. 43 Except for such withholding tax liability in certain cases,
trusts would be exempt from tax. Under this approach trusts would have a
zero basis for assets held in kind, and thus there would be no depreciation
problem with respect to depreciable assets held in trust.' 44 Depreciable
property would not acquire a basis for allowance of depreciation until
distributions occur.
Another approach to the problem posed by use of trusts suggested by
commentators is to retain the present structure of Subchapter "J," and to
treat trusts as taxpayers. A trust would include initial funding transfers in
income and thus pay income tax, 45 presumably at the highest income tax
bracket in the case of sizable funding transfers. Concededly, under this
proposal, some unfairness could result if the beneficiary who is the equitable
owner of the assets held in trust is in a lower bracket. The extent of the
fairness problem is in large measure a function of the bracket spread used
in the income tax structure. In a regime of few brackets, tightly compacted,
the problem is less severe. A possible solution is to permit, in certain cases,
the beneficiary to elect to have the corpus, on receipt in trust, to be directly
taxed to the beneficiary.'" Any exclusions that would have been accorded
the beneficiary had the beneficiary been a direct transferee could thus be
used. Depending upon the extent of bracket spread, income averaging
methods could be employed to deal with "bunching" of large amounts
within a year.147
Liquidity may be a problem if income tax is due upon donative receipt
in-kind of nonmarketable or difficult to market assets. Suggestions to deal
with liquidity problems include authorization for deferred payment of tax
in installments' 4 or the assigning of a zero basis to such assets as real estate
and closely held business interests. 
49
Another problem of including donative receipts in income is that of
distinguishing between transfers pursuant to obligations to support depend-
ents, which presumably should not be taxed, and truly donative payments
which should be taxed.5 0 However, this problem is not novel to the proposal
to include donative receipts in income and arises as well under the current
estate and gift tax system, where payments made pursuant to support
obligations are not within the transfer tax base. Transfers which enable
142. Dodge, supra note 135, at 1180-81.
143. Id. at 1197.
144. Id. at 1195.
145. Gac & Brougham, supra note 82, at 95.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 92.
148. Id. at 99.
149. Dodge, supra note 135, at 1199-1200.-
150. Id. at 1202-08.
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current consumption by dependents should pose no insurmountable prob-
lems, nor should those for payment of medical expenses and tuition costs.
Transfers of securities and cash which serve to "endow" the transferee
would be included in the tax base to the extent in excess of prescribed
exclusion amounts.
Generation-skipping, as such, does not present a direct potential for
abuse under the proposal to include gifts and bequests in the income tax
base, at least in terms of the underlying policy of taxing individuals under
the income tax by reference to ability to pay. However, in the normal order
of things, accumulated wealth owned free of trust would be transferred at
least once each generation, and would thus be included in the enlarged
income tax base at least that frequently. Use of trusts benefitting multiple
generations thus would result in a potential loss of revenue if accumulated
wealth is not taxed at each generation within the income tax base. Whether
estate planners would advise, and clients concur in, use of multiple-gener-
ation trusts to minimize income tax is unclear, and may be a function of
the income tax rate structure. Such an income tax minimizing strategy is
implemented at the cost of postponing the receipt and enjoyment of wealth
(trust distributions) by the beneficiaries who are the objects of bounty. If,
however, use of multi-generational trusts is encouraged under the proposal
to include gifts and bequests in income, the goal of neutrality is to that
extent undermined. Some sort of generation-skipping levy, such as imposing
income tax on trusts with respect to corpus and accumulated income at
periodic intervals, perhaps every thirty or thirty-five years, may prove to
be needed.'
Any consideration of expanding the income tax base by including
donative receipts in the income of recipients is likely to be politically
controversial. Congress would face difficult choices with respect to the
treatment of items such as life insurance proceeds and wrongful death tort
recoveries paid to survivors and in establishing exclusion amounts. To
achieve neutrality and fairness, careful attention must be paid to problems
presented by trust arrangements and to the deferral issues posed by trusts.
Whether the political constraints to implementing a fair scheme of including
donative receipts in income are surmountable is unclear. However, the
technical problems involved in achieving fairness and neutrality appear
solvable, although the solutions may require a degree of complexity. In the
ongoing process of attempting to improve the income tax, the proposal to
include donative receipts in the income tax base deserves careful and
sympathetic consideration. In addition to an improved income tax, such
consideration could facilitate abolition of the current estate, gift, and
generation-skipping taxes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current system of transfer taxation should be abolished. In taxing
transferors rather than transferees in donative transactions the structure of
151. Gac & Brougham, supra note 82, at 96-97.
19931
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:539
the present scheme is fundamentally flawed. The current transfer tax system
does not achieve its perceived goals and produces revenues that are grossly
inadequate in relation to its unfairness, inefficiency, and lack of neutrality.
These revenues are insufficient to compensate for the costs and burdens
imposed by the system. Proposed reforms and refinements of the present
system, if implemented, are unlikely to make burdens and costs of the
system tolerable. Reasonable people differ as to whether wealth transfers
should be subject to taxation. If such transfers are properly subject to tax
and if such tax should be borne only by the wealthiest segment of the
population, Congress should replace the present system with a transferee-
based accessions tax with appropriate exclusions and exemptions. The ac-
cession tax model offers a structure that is inherently fairer, more efficient,
and more neutral than the current system. As an alternative, although
politically more difficult to implement, Congress should give careful con-
sideration to the proposal to make the income tax base more comprehensive
by including donative transfers within the transferee's gross income. Under
either alternative, Congress would rid the Internal Revenue Code of the
current outdated and overly complex system while enhancing the realization
of the policy goals for the future of transfer taxation
